INTEH.NATIONAL ECONOIVIIC LAW

SHADOW UNILATERALISM: ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AT THE WTO

RACHEL BREWSTER'
1.

INTRODUCTION

For lawyers, the study of international law is often frustrating
for its distinct lack of a court system. The institution of law exists,
but there are rarely neutral arbitrators to amwunce the content of
the rules or declare that a government has violated the law.
Rather, it is up to the disputing parties lo decide whether a breach
has occurred and what remedy, if any, is available. As if this was
not

difficult

enough,

where

international

courts

do

exist,

govenu·nents have the habit of resisting the courts' jurisdiction or
ignoring their rulings.

International law skeptics ask whether,

such a system of unilateral rather than centralized
enforcement, international law can properly be called law a t all.

given

Advocates of international law genera11y point skeptics to one
notable exception-the quasj-judicial system of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO''). Within this trade agreement, the member
governments have established a set of procedures, embodied in the
Dispute Settlemen t Understanding ("DSU") agreement, whereby a
neutral judicial panel with compulsory jurisdiction over claims
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brought by mt·mber governments has the exclusive power to
decide when violations of the agreement have occurred, and sets
out the remedy

for

violations.

Thus far, governments

generally abided by the terms of Lhe DSU agreernen t.
of the WTO in cstablishi11g

a

have

The success

multllaleral dispute scttle1nent system

has led to significant political and scholarly attention.

Diplomats

and trade negotiators have referred to the DSU as the "crovvn
jewel" of the \NTO

system.

International law scholars

have

developed varying hypotheses lo expl21in the success of the trade

In

institution.
accomplished

in

this

Article,

terms

multilateral process,

of

T

discuss

enforcing

whe1t

trade

the

ru !es

DSU

has

through

a

In doing so, I want to highlight both the

successes of the institution in curtailing unilateralism- but also its
limits. Both are significant.
Given the special fonn<�t of this issue, I take for gwnted that the
reader has smne knowledge of the WTO system. This brief Article
begins in Secbon 2 with a short background to
Agreement on Tariff and

Trade ("GATT")

and

the General

WTO dispute

settlement systems (other n1ore detailed analyses o£ the evolution
of the trade system are easily available elsewhere).

In Section 3" I

discuss how a rnulblatcral syste1n aJ1.d unilateral system of trade
enforcement coexisted under the GATT regime.

Governments

could seek multilateral resolution of trade disputes through the
GATT system, but governments (particularly the United States)
often chose to make and enforce their own determinations of
whether another government had bteached a trade agreement. By
contrast,

the

major

innovation

of

the

WTO

system

is

that

governments have agreed that the DSU will be the exdLtsive means
to enforce trade law.

Governments are to cease the unilateral

enforcement of WTO rules.
In Section 4, I analyze how the instit1Jtional design of the DSU
impacts

its

enforcement.
provides

a

goal

of

supplanting

unilateral

1neans

of

trade

Specifically, I examine how the DSU system only
prospective

remedy-that

is,

the

DSU

permits

retaliation only for injuries that take place after the conclusion of

WTO litigation determining whether a breach occurred.

The DSU

thus immunizes violations of WTO trade law from retaliatory
sanctioning so long as the offending measures are withdrawn at
the end of the litigation process, which is often several years later.
This immunity, which I refer to as the "stall-and-withdraw"
loophole} leaves injured governments with no inlmediate remedy
for WTO violations under the DSU system, regardless o.f how great
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the trade effects of the violation are.

"l135

.In this Section, I suggest that

the institutional design of the DSU effectively creates a need for the
unilateral enforcement of trade rules and, oddly, provides legal
protection for unilateral sanctions.

1 conclude by atternpting to

provide a vievv of the DSU that acknowledges its advances from its
origins in the GATT regime but also acknowledges its inability to
completely control unilateral retaliation.

2.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF GATT AND Vv'TO DiSPUTE
SETTLEMENT

A full account of the evolution of international trade law from
the GATT to the current \NTO regime cannot be captured in this
Article.
growth

l t is a rich history involving changing views of economic
theory,

-international

security

concerns,

contentious

domestic politics, experimentation in legal institutio.nal design, and
changing environmental and public health demc-1nds, among many
other influences. Below I provide a brief account of the events and
political demands that led to the creation of the DSU.
Following the end of World War H, the victorious wartime
allies began to negotiate a rnullilateral agreement to govern
international trade rules.

The h·ade negotiations lasted from 1946

to 1948 and culmi11ated in the drafting of the International Trade
Organization ("ITO") Charter-a 1nultilateral agreement on the
trade in goods. The ITO was to have a sophisticated organizational
structure thC'lt included submission of all trade disputes to the
United Nations' Interrtational Court of Justice. The ITO, however,
failed to come into existence, because it failed to gain sufficient
poHtical support in the United States Senate. Once it became clear
that the Senate would not ratify the agreement, other governments
had little interest in bringing the treaty into force.

The failure of

the ITO effectively eliminated the prospect of a formal dispute
settlement system in international trade law. Without the ITO, the
opeTative treaty governing trade relations became the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade CGATT") agreement, a skeletal
agreement that was negotiated as an interim measure to lower
tariff levels. Unlike the ITO, the GATT agreement did not have an
organizational structure: there was not a formal organizabonal
body, there were no provisions for future trade negotiations, and
there were no procedures for the resolution of disputes.

A trade

system was born without a formal set of procedures for enJorcing
trade law.
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As is well documented by Robert Hudec and others, a dispute
settlement system eventually developed in the GATT regime that
was a rnix of legal analysis and diplomacy. The dispute settlement
system evolved ovet· the life of the GATT regime (and smne o[ its
practices

changed

significantly),

but

it

can

nevertheless

be

described in broad strokes.

Trade disputes were supposed to be
subtnitted to arbitration, which consisted of a panel of three
arbitralors selected by the parties. The arbitrators would decide if

there was a trade violation and submit a report to the GATT
goven1n1ents. The governments could then adopt the report and, if
the panel found a violation, authorize the complaining party to
retaliate against the respondent government.
While this systen1. st�ems quite legal in principle, we n1ust
examine its political aspects to understand how the GATT system
operated in practice.

Dispute settlement worked on a consensus
system-that is, every party to the GATT agreement had to agree,

or at least not object, to any action by the GATT body.

rhus each

step of the dispute resolution process had to meet the consensus
requirement.

Both

the

complaining

govenunent

and

respondent government had to agree to the formation of

a

the

panel to

hear the dispute, the selection of the arbitrators, a11d the adoption
of the report by the GATT parties.

In short, the respondent

government collld veto the process at several different points -at
which time the legal case would, [or most intents and purposes,
simply cease. Yet parties often did not veto the panel process.

In

the later days of the GATT regime, the parties mutually agreed not
to block the formation of a panel, but respondent governments
could still slow the process significantly and retained the ability to
block the adoption of the report.
For all its institutional weakness, the GATT systen1 worked
fairly well as a diplom,atic dispute settlement system.

When
governments were politically open to settling the dispute, the

GATT system provided a neutral arbitration process. Cmnplaining
governments could also raise awareness of other states' poor trade
practices even ii the legal case never advanced forward.

In the

end, the GATT syste1n did a surprisingly good job of dispute
resolution given its procedural limitations.
The GATT system of dispute resolution was intended to be the
exclusive

means

of

determining

whether

agreement had occurred, but it was not.
system

coexisted

enforcement.

with

a

unilateral

a violation

of the

In practice, the GATT
system

of

trade

law

Given the ineffectiveness of GATT in dealing with
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politically sensitive breaches of trade law, governments started

exan1ple, the
an exclusively

enforcing i_nternational trade rules on their ow11. For
United States government famousiy began using

domestic

decision-making process to determine whether other

governments were violating GATT trade rules or otherwise h-ading
in ways the United States government deemed "unfair."
United

States

government

would

sanctions when it fow1d violations.

unilatcral1y

The

impose

h-ade

These measures were called

''Section 301" actions, after the section of the 1974 Ttade Act that
authorized the executive to apply these sanctions_1

judge,

As the sole

the United States, unsurprisingly1 was quick to find that

other states were breaching the GATT while never finding its own
questiona b1e trade measures were violations.
The United Stales government was able to maintain this system
of unilateral enforcement o f trade law without significant fear of
retaliation

(with the exception of the European Communities

(" EC") and son1etimes Japan) primarily because access to the
American market was rnore important to U.S. trading partners
than any one export n1arket was to the United States. Restated, the
size of the United States market made exclusion from this market
very costly to an economicaJly smaller nation's exporters, but the
smaller size of the other nation's 1narket made exclusion from its
markets only moderately costly to A_merican exporters.

While the

United States was not the only country to take such measures- the
EC similarly had the authority under its law to sanction violations
of

international

b·ade

law-U.S.

Section

301

actions

caused

significant consternation abroad. Other governn1ents charged that

the United States was acting "unilaterally"- using access to the
U.S. market to attack other governments' policies while refusing to
alter its own breaches of trade law.

ln advance of the GAIT's Uruguay Round-the 1982-1994
round

of

trade

agreements-the

negotiations
participating

that

established

govern.rnents

agreed

the

WTO

that

the

current system of dispute resolution needed to be reformed. Even
the U.S. Congress was pressing the executive branch to negotiate a
stricter system of international trade enforcement. Although all of
the governments were repeating the mantra of reform, their
political goals were vastly different.

Most governments wanted

the United States to abandon its practice of tmilaterally enforcing
t

Sec Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006) (outlining the actions of U.S.

trade representatives).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pn. f. lilt'/ L.

1138

[Vol. 30:4

its own interpretation of trade law, whi.le the U.S. Congress wanted
the rest of the world to approve (and thus stop objechng to) its
Section 301 process.

During the negotiations, the United States

executive branch pushed for a quasi-court system:

an

arbitration

body (1) t.haf could adjudicate complatnts on a strict ti1ne sch edule
and

(2)

whose decisions would be automatically enforced through

trade sanctions. Other goven1n1ents were more ::;keptica l of such a
legalized process, preferring instead the existing GATT approach
with.

its

emphasis

on

diplo1nacy;

these

governrnents

·were

pritnarlly concerned with curtailing the U.S. government's use of
Section 301.
To address these concerns, the governrnents participating in
lhe U rugu ay Rolrnd created the World Trade Organization as a
framework agreement and embodied the specific procedures for
multilateral enforcen1ent of trade rules in the Dispute Settlement
Understanding.

The

ultimate

con1prornise

on

Lrade

law

enforcement includes strict time h1nits, wluch cannot be blocked by
the respondent governments.

The decisions of the arhitrahon

panel are subject to review by a standing and independent
Appellate Body and are then adopted by the WTO members
(sitting as the Dispute Settlement Body).

The Dispute Settle1nent

Body adopts the reports by reverse consensus- that is, the report is
adopted unless every men1ber government, including the wim1i.ng
government, objecls to the decision.

In return, the United States

agreed to apply trade sanctions only if the new multilateral dispute
settlement process determines that there is a violation. At its core_,
the DSU requires that the United States forego its practice of
unilateral trade enforcement in return for an effective tnultilateral
process.
As with most compromises, none of the par ties were entirely
pleased with the DSU. Various governments objected that the new
system was too litigious and gave insufficient deference to national
trade policy goals.
grounds.

The U.S. Congress objected on different

Members of Congress argued that the new system

undermined state sovereignty and gutted the United States' ability
to apply trade sanctions when it believed there vvas a violation of
the b·ade agreement.

1nstead of negotiating the international

system's approval of Section 3011 the executive had all but ended
the program.

Metnbers of Congress threatened to reject the DSU

agreement, but eventually accepted the DSU system as part of the
package of WTO trade concessions.
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ln Section-�, l discuss hm,v the DSU is not the exclusive means
by which govern ments seek to enforce VVTO trade rules. A system
of

unilateral

cm1tinues

enforcement

multilateral S\'Stem.

to

<::>xist

alongside

the

Bul before we Lmderstand the lim.itations of

the DSU, in particular the way in which the DSU as an insUtution
effectively permits (and perh21ps encour21gcs) retaliation outside of
ils fre1mework, vve need to discuss the structul'e of the DSU system.

3.

TH S i IV1 PACT OF THE DSU ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF
TRADE RULES

The core of the DSU agreement can be summed up as follows:
rncrnbcr states have pron1ised to subordinate their right to retaliate

legally

for

21rbitration.
occurred,

the

illegal

act

of

another

government

to

WTO

The arbitration covers both whether a breach has
and,

if so, the

government can retaliate.

extent

to

which

the

complaining

ln addilion, respondent governments

have agreed to accept the decision of the arbitrator (be it a panel or
the Appdlate Body) as Lo whelher its aclions are in breach of the
agreement and thus will not counter-retaliate.
significallce
international

To understand the

of this agreement, we first have to know how
law

dispute

.resolution

works

without

such

a

procedural agreement.

3.1. i\. Brief A1lnlysis of Public hzternntiorzal Law
lntel'n8tional law is popularly viewed as significantly different
them "real"

domestic law because internabonal

law

lacks an

entrenched systen1 of enforcement. International law has rules, but
not necessarily a judicial system to enforce these rules. Given the
special format of this issue, I offer a simplified description of the
enforcement of international law in the absence of agreed upon
dispute settlement rules. Governments can corrunit in a treaty to a
system of rules, and the treaty forms the basis for international
law- that is, legally binding rules between the parties to the treaty.
There are various other ways to form international law (some of
which are n1ore controversial), but I .focus here on treaties because
treaty law is the basis of most international h·ade rules. Treaty law
is formed when a group of governments ngree to a treaty text and
ratify tllat text. The treaty is then international law, at least with
regard to the parties to the treaty.
The existence of the treaty, however, does not necessarily 1nean
that lhere is a neutral, authoritative body to declare what the treaty
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requires and whether one party has breached it.

Rather, both

governn1ents are equally valid interpreters of the treaty (and, thus,
why governments almost never admit that they have violated
international lavv even if they privately think a violation has
occurred).

The

interested

21uthm·i talive judges.

parties

tl1emselves

ar�

equally
The parties could mutually agree to resolve

the dispute by appointing a neutral arbitrator, but both p21rties
have to consent.

While governments son1etimes agree to do this,

one party often refuses to consent £or various reasons, not the least
of which is a distrust that the arbitrator will "correctly" interpret
the treaty.
Now thnt the treaty exists, let's say that one party takes an

action that the other party considers to be a violation of the
agreement. Government A believes that Government B has passed
some domestic meast1re that breaches the treaty.

Government B

disagrees and clain1s thal its actions are perfectly consistent with
the treaty.
What will the governments do to resolve their dispute?

We

have a situation where two interpretations of the treaty exist.
Government A can claim that the treaty was violated, and, under
its

interpretation,

legally

retaliate

against Government

B

by

breaching the agreement in a proportionate manner. Government
B can then disagree that any violation occurred and, under its
interpretation, declare that Government A's countern1easures are
themselves a violation of treaty -one that Government B views as
illegal because Govenu11ent B does not acknowledge that a
preceding violation of the treaty ever occurred. This can continue
in

a

spiral:

Government

Government
A's

B

violation,

adopting

countermeasures

Government

A

then

for

adopting

additional countern1easures for Government B' s new ''illegal"
response to its "legal" retaliation, and so on. In the context of trade
law, the spiral is referred to as a "trade war." Obviously, disputes
do not always spiral like this.

The threat of a spiral can keep

Goverrunent B from breaching initially, keep Government A fr01n
retaJiati.ng

in

the

first

instance,

keep

Government

B

fron1

responding to Government A's retaliation, or otherwise stop the
fight at some later point.
The frustration for 1awyers is that result of the dispute tends to
be based on politics (who can hurt whom worse or who has the
political will to stay in the tight longest), rather than the legal
merits. The enforcement of international law is often an exercise in
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political or econmnic power rather than

an analysis of e;Kh

government's legal argLLments.

3.2. Rctuming to lutemutiont7! Trarfe Lnw
Tt is against this backdrop that the GATT system operated - a
system of international law enforcement where each governn1ent is
able

to

rnaintain

the

correctness

of

i ts

legal

analysis

21nd

unilaterally retal iate agG�inst peTceived violations. The DSU is
significant becwse it moved beyond the clefault international law
basel ine. Governments have foregone their right to determine on
their own whether another goven1n1ent has violated the WTO
agreement.

Conseq uently, the DSU can claim to have elimi nated

the dual interpretatiL)n problem.

As I will discuss in Section 3,

however, the institutional design of the DSU still permits unilateral
retaliation and, thus, has not solved this issue completely.
The GATT effectively let unilateral enforcement coexist vvitl1 its
multilateral svstem.
J

The GATT achieved notable successes i n

establishing a systemc of netJ b·al dispute resolution, b u t i t was slow

and could be effectively blocked by either party to a dispute.
Consequently, the participating governments often resorted to
unilateral determinations of what was a violation of international
trade rules and unilateral enforcen1cnt of the agreement.
Uni.lateral retaliation could (and sometimes did) descend into trade
wars, although far nl.ore often led to more economically powerful
governments imposing their views on less economically powerful
governments. The d ifferences i n economic power allowed the U.S.
government and the EC (as jts internal market i n tegrated i n the
later years of the GATT) to impose sanctions against thejr trading
partners with sn1aller economies without n:mch fear of counter
retaliation.

Although urulateral trade enforcement was never

explicitly permitted under the GATT regime, the weakness of the

institution o-eated a situation where this was the open pracbce of

some governments, even though many conunentators would say
that unilateral retaliation under the GATI was i l legaL
The DSU has changed the GATT system i n significant ways. If
one member has allegedly breached

a WTO agreen1ent, the

mernbers of the WTO have agreed to constrai nts on their ability to
breach (legally) the treaty in reply, claiming the other member's
violation as the legal justification. The notable point for the " rule
of law'' element is that the finding of breach is based upon the legal

merits of the case rather than the relative economic power of the
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parties. Of course, the influence of economic power remains:

the

decision to bring a case, the extent to which sanctions are effective,
the cost of good legal representatio.n at the WTO and other
advantages of economic power continue to influence the WTO
dispute settlement system. Nonetheless, the DSU system is

a

rnore

rule-based system than the previous GATT system.

By ceding the authority to adjudicate trade disputes to an
arbit.ration body, member governments have created a system of
dispute resolution that is ostensibly based on legal rules rather
than power, at least with regard to whether a government has or
has not breached the agreement.

ln practice, the DSU system

works something like this: if Government A raises its tariff rates
on cars coming from the terri tory of Governn1ent B and
Governmenl B believes that this is a violation of the GATT
agreem.ent

(or another

agreement in

the WTO),

then

under

international law rules, Government B may want to retaliate by
breaching the agreement in a proportion(lte way- say, by raising
the

tariff rates on n1otorcycles coming from the lerritory of

Government A.
could,

as

a

matter
the

multilaterally,
Government

Whj}e under the GATT regime Government B

B

of

DSU

receive

state

practice,

agreement

act

unilatera!Jy

explicitly

authorization

from

the

requires
WTO

or
that

before

retaliating against Government A fot the retaliation to be legally
justified.

Restated, Government B' s retaliation is n o t itself a

violation o f the WTO agreement if it receives authorjzation for the
retaliation through the DSU process.

If the WTO finds that there

was not a breach, then Government B cannot legally retaliate a t all.
Thus for WTO members to claim the legal right to retaliate against
others members' alleged breaches of the agreement, they n1ust fi.rst
receive

the

approval

of

the

WTO

by

going

through

DSU

procedures.
4.

THE IMPORT ANT GAPS: RETALIATION OUTSIDE OF THE
DSUPROCESS
While the DSU is a significant development in international

dispute settlement, the agreement has not successfully curtailed
the

unilateral

enforcement

scholars suggest.

international

trade

law

as

many

Governments can still adopt retaliatory trade

policies- that is, punitive sanctions or a measure that mirrors the
one about which they are complaining, although they can no
longer claim that such aclions are legal. The DSU agreement links
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the legality of retaliation to use of the \NTO dispute resolution

p roced u res .
based on
The

a

I�etaliation i s i l legal - even if proportionate - if i t is

u n i l a teral deter.mination of a violation.

i n terest i 11 g element

ejli!ctit1ely permits such

here

is

that

the DSU

i n s t i tu t ion

i l le ga l retaliation because it immunizes both

\'iolations and illegal retaliation to those viola lions for at least
eighteen months (although tl1e time period is Jikelv to be much
longer) - what I re fer to as the II stall-and-wi thdraw'' loophole. r
say ''effectively" because this is not the expl icit goal of the DSU,
and i t certainly does not match the text of the DSU.
term5,

the DSU claims

rcg<l r\.1 ing

almost

all

By its own

to have jurisdiction o v er all disputes

of

the

WTO agreements

(the

"coverled

agreerncnts," in DSU terms), and states have ag reed to give up
unilc1teral retaliatio.n. Nevertheless, the institution.Jl design of the
DSU permils governments more options i n practice. ln fact, the
fa ilure of the DSU d es ign to provide a remedy during the li tigation
process arguably

creates

enforcement strategies

an Incentive for governments to usc

that are formally

proh i bited the WTO

fra mework. This is where the institu tiona} design analysis and the
legal a na lysis of the DSU text d i ffer. My analysis is concerned with
the institutional design elements.
The DSU system

effectively

permits retaliation by providing

govern.ments with legal immunity for their actions until such tiTne
as the

DSU adjudicatory system declares the action to be a

violation. Under the terms of the DSU, governments cannot legally
impose sanctions for violations o f the agreement until t hey have
received a WTO finding o£ a breach.

Then the WTO will only

au thorize prospective sanctions, meaning sanctions from the time o f
the finding going forward into the future. Any econon1ic damage
caused

by

the

breach

up

until

the

WTO

finding

is

not

com pensa ted.
A government can breach the WTO agreement m1.til the DSU
litigation is complete and other governments are not legally
permitted t o retalia te.

The m.i n i mllln

time to complete the

litigation process is eighteen months. This includes consu l t a tions,
a panel hearing, an appeal a nd a reasonable period of time to
comply. WTO l i tigation may continue after this point, b u t then the
complaining government can apply sanctions for the current
negative trade effects if the offending measure is n o t re1noved
(subject t o a n arbitration hearing on the level of sanctioning).
Although the n1.inimum time is eighteen months, most litigation a t
t he WTO tnkes vears. For instance, Antigua continues to pursue a
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case against the United States foT
Agreement on Trade in Services.

Cl

the Genera]

violation of

Antigua formally began the

.d ispute resolution process in March 2003.

Reta l i a tory sanctions

were not authorized until August 2005 - over two years after the
cC�se was filed. Other cases have gone on for much longer.

If a government removes the offending mee�sLu·e after the DSU
proc�ss is completed, then other governments are not compensated
no tnatter how much damage the measure has caused.

Of course,

the DSU text does not state that governments have imrnunjty froTTl
sanctions u n t i l the case is adjudicated.

Quite the opposile:

the

DSU states that governments should cornply at a l l times w i l h their
legal obiigations.

l t is here that an analysis of the text of the DSU

and an analysis of lhe DSU' s institutional design lead i n different
d i rections. The legal text does not explicitly authorize government
immunity for breaches of trade law during the DSU adjudication
process, but the design o f the institution creates a de facto free pass
so long as the measure is withdrawn at the end of the l i t igation.
For ins tance, in March 2002, President Bush raised tariff rates
on steel imports.

Although President Bush claimed that this was

legal under the WTO agreement, i t was widely viewed

as a

violation of international trade rules by both domestic and foreign
observers.

Yet other nations were not allowed to retaliate Ltnder

the DSU rules until the WTO' s Dispute Settlement Body declared
this measure a vio.lation.

When the WTO d i d forma l l y declare the

higher tariff rates a violation in December 2003, President Bush
si1nply withdrew the measure.

Blatantly using this

o

stall and

withdraw" loophole, President Bush was able to violate the WTO
agreements, and yet other governments were not permitted to
retaliate against the United States for the damage caused.

Other

states ntay have altered their diplomatic posture towards the Bush
adminish·ation during this time or there n1ay have been some
reputational loss (although the impact and degree of reputational
losses are controversial), but other governments were unable, if
they abided by the legal strictures of the WTO, to reply in kind.
Of course, other states can reply in kind.

The con1plainlng

governments do not claim that such retaliation is lega l - these
governments

probably privately view

will

such

reta l iation as

illegal under the WTO although the govenunents have absolutely
no

incentive

retaliation

to

ever

remains

governments.
international

publicly

within

the

admit
range

to
of

that- b u t
policy

u n i lateral

choices

for

The issue here is not just that states can violate
law,

even
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procedural

rules

about

addressing
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Rather, it is thal the insli lutional design of the DSU

violations.

'

inf luences govcrnmt-•n ts decisions on when and how to act outside

of the DSU framework. That is, the institutional design of the DSU
influences governments' decisions as to when they should v i olate
the DSU.
Specifically, the DSU's stalt -clnd-withdrcnv loophole creates a
demand for trade retaliation outside of the DSU framework.
Covernn1ents that find that the DSU's forward-looking rcrncdies,
which do nol provide for compensation for economic damages that
occur cl1 1ring the litigat ion process. are unsa tisfying will seek t lll
a l ter-native. 1n addition, where the irnmediate effec ts of a viol<-�tion
hr.we a significant economic impact on the injured state, domestic
poli tice1l conditions may require domestic leaders to take action
before the DSU p rocess can be concluded.
rhe DSU's institutional design
because, ironicaHy,

it

provides

tjjectively

permits such actions

some cover for

WTO

i l legal

retaliat ion. Just as other states cannot legally retaliate against the
initial breach, retaliation in response lo that breach is entitled to the
same protection. Thus both governments may be 1n breach of the
WTO agreement but neither is legally al1owed to respond to Lhe
other's violation before tl1e DSU process has been contpleted.

In

practice, this means that injured states can p u rsue a two-step
enJorcement policy. They can retaliate immediately (and iUegally)
for the perceived violations of one of their trading partners as well
as pursue WTO litigation. This is one way to interpret the ongoing
dispute between the United States and the EU over subsidies to
Airbus and Boeing. Each has a lleged the other unfairly subsidizes
its

aircraft

manufacturing

industry.

Both

goveTnments

are

arguably violating the WTO's rule on subsid ies, but nonetheless
each

is

retaliabng

outside

of

the

WTO

framework

while

simultaneously pursuing a DSU ruling. These cases - the EU and
Unilcd States have each filed a con1plaint against the other's

2004 and are still ongojng.
in 2007 the European Union

practices - began in October
Along the same lines,

actively

considered a proposal, advocated by French President Jacques
Chirac, to impose a carbon tax on imports from the United States
un t i l such time as the Uni ted States joins the Kyoto Protocol. This
imposition of a carbon tax on U.S. goods is arguably a violation of
the WTO Agreement.

The mostly likely response by the United

States governn1ent, which is considering its own carbon duty on
imports, to the EC actions would have been imposing a similar
carbon tax on the goods from the EC (and perhaps other states as
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well).
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One or both could also bring

c1

vVTO case, b u t more

immediote measures are also in ei ther government's range of
policy options.

Indeed, the stall-and-wi thdraw loophole creates a

need for more immediate, if i l legal, action.
Fim 'll ly, goverrunents can retaliate using measures tl1at seen1
tangential to the issue a t hand, and yet be attempting to enforce
trC�de rules outside of the WTO fr<lmewot·k. For i n s tance, the
United States government could respond to EU health and safety
measures that the U.S. views as a viobtion of the WTO's Sanitary
and Phytosan i tary ("SPS'') Agreement by increasing its inspections
of EU agriculture exports or qt.1aranlining certa i n products.

The

public may not recognize this as unila teral enforcemenl action and
yet it could influence the EU's irnplementation o f health a n d safety
measures.

5.

CONCLUSION

The DSU has n1ade major strides in establishing a rule of law
system for the adjudication of in ternational trade d isputes.

In

many ways, i t i s a n1odel for how dispute settlement institutions in
other areas nught be designed; and yet, the DSU has its own
institutional l i mitations. The core legal principle o f the DSU is tha t
governm.ents forego u n i lateral trade enforcement in favor of a
multilateral process, but the institutional design of the DSU has a
different effect.
unilateral

The sb·ucture of the DSU creates a demand for

retaliation

agreernent

during

by

i nununizing

l i t igation.

So

breaches

long

as

of

the

the

WTO

respondent

government ·withdraws the measure after the DSU litigation i s
complete, WTO n1e1nber governments cannot
breach.
retaliation

legnlly respond

t o the

In addition, th.e DSU syslem pern1its the unilateral
the

san1e

legal

immunity

as

the

a l leged

breach.

ConsequentlyJ a n analysis of the DSU system has to balance the
successes of the system i n constraining unilateral action w i t h the
institutional design elements of the DSU
encourage, unilateral action.
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that permit, if n o t

